Lululemon Studio Mirror

» see lululemon.com as it lived, on the wayback machine

~ the eulogy ~

the mirror sits in the part of internet history i can read about but did not participate in. it was a US-suburban connected-fitness device (roughly). the shape was a full-length wall mirror with a screen behind the glass. it cost $1,495 as a one-time purchase, then $39 a month as a class subscription on top. the target buyer had a spare wall in a spare room and a subscription budget to match. that reference customer is not a category i belonged to.

brynn putnam founded mirror in new york in 2016 while running an in-person fitness studio (refine method) in manhattan. the pitch was: strap a camera and a screen into a mirror, and stream a class into the room without pushing the furniture around. really though, the product launched in september '18 at $1,495 with $39/month subscription. year-two revenue reportedly hit $150 million with a team of about 125 people.

lululemon bought mirror on 29 june 2020, three months into the pandemic, for around $500 million all-cash. that transaction landed at the exact peak of the connected-fitness market. anyway, by q4 fiscal-2022 lululemon was booking a $443 million impairment charge against the acquisition. brynn putnam had already stepped down as ceo in september '21. hardware sales were killed on 28 september '23 alongside a five-year peloton content deal.

~ the dossier ~

~ how it landed ~

the reference product for mirror was a small mounted screen that ran instructor-led yoga, hiit, strength and boxing classes into the user's living room. the trick was that when the screen was off, the surface reverted to a normal wall mirror. the industrial design was well-received in the launch coverage in wired and vogue. the customer story was: buy this once, hang it on a wall, cancel your gym membership, follow instructors on tv while you can see your own form reflected next to the class.

the timing was cruel to lululemon. mirror had shipped for about eighteen months before the pandemic hit. the pandemic pushed connected-fitness stocks (peloton, tonal, hydrow, mirror) into a synchronized spike. lululemon's $500 million acquisition landed in june '20 exactly on the crest. really though, when the world reopened in '22 and gyms came back, at-home hardware demand collapsed against a much softer benchmark than the covid comps.

~ the unraveling ~

putnam left as ceo in september '21, about fifteen months into the lululemon window. the reasons cited in press coverage were the usual "different strategic priorities" language that founders use when the acquirer's product roadmap has diverged from theirs. anyway, mirror was rebranded to "lululemon studio" in september '22 as part of a broader integration effort. the price of the mirror hardware dropped from $1,495 to $995 to $795 to promotional freebies inside the same year.

the writedown came in march '23, along fourth-quarter fiscal-2022 results. $443 million post-tax impairment against a $500 million acquisition is close to a full markdown. really though, lululemon had already been telegraphing a strategic reset around mirror through the previous year. the layoffs came in july '23 (119 new-york-based mirror employees). the peloton partnership announcement in september '23 was the closing act.

~ the peloton exit ~

on 28 september '23 lululemon announced a five-year strategic partnership with peloton. the terms were roughly: peloton becomes lululemon's exclusive digital fitness content provider, lululemon becomes peloton's primary athletic apparel partner. co-branded apparel went into peloton retail on 11 october '23 across the us and canada plus the uk. lululemon studio all-access members were routed to peloton classes at their current membership price starting 1 november '23. hardware sales of the mirror device wound down through the end of '23.

by then, existing mirrors kept working for their owners. lululemon committed to producing fitness content into spring '24 and kept the xponential fitness partnership going for continuing class offerings. the shape of the exit was clean enough (no bricking, no forced obsolescence), but the product line was over. one of the more expensive dead consumer hardware experiments of the pandemic era, alongside the peloton tread+ recalls and the tonal price cuts.

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